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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW-Guilty
Plea Is Not Invalid Because It Is the Product of
a Plea Bargain.
On December 2, 1963, Henry C. Alford was indicted for first de-
gree murder under North Carolina law. The North Carolina homicide
statute provided that first degree murder was punishable by death, un-
less the jury recommended life imprisonment.' Alford's court-appointed
attorney recommended, in light of strong evidence of guilt, that he plead
guilty. The prosecutor agreed to accept a plea of guilty to second de-
gree murder, and at trial, on December 10, 1963, Alford pleaded guilty
to that charge.
Before accepting the guilty plea, the trial judge heard a summary of
the State's case and informed Alford of the consequences of his plea.
Alford acknowledged that his counsel had informed him of the difference
between first and second degree murder and of his rights in case he
chose to go to trial. Although Alford affirmed his decision to plead
guilty, he stated he was pleading guilty only to avoid the possibility
of the death penalty for first degree murder. He also testified that
he did not commit the murder, but was pleading guilty on the basis of
what his attorney had told him. The trial court accepted his plea and
sentenced him to thirty years in prison.
Alford sought post conviction relief in 1965. The state court found
that the plea was willingly, knowingly, and understandingly made on
the advice of competent counsel, and in light of a strong prosecutorial
case. In 1965, Alford's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied
by the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
Carolina and by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit on the
basis of the state court's findings.
In 1967, Alford again petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus which
was denied on the same ground as in 1965 without an evidentiary hear-
ing. However, in 1968, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
1. At the time Alford pleaded guilty, the statute provided that if a guilty plea to
first degree murder was accepted, the penalty would be life imprisonment, rather than
death. (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (1969)). This provision permitting guilty pleas in
capital cases was repealed in 1969. See Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790,
792-95 (1970). However, under North Carolina law it remains possible for a person
charged with a capital offense to plead guilty to a lesser charge.
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reversed, holding that Alford's guilty plea was involuntarily made as
it was motivated by a fear of the death penalty.2 The court reasoned
that the North Carolina statute encouraged pleas of guilty to murder,
thereby inducing Alford to waive his right to trial by jury, by promising
a maximum of thirty years in prison rather than the threat of the death
penalty. The court said that under the rationale of United States v.
Jackson,' this encouragement to plead guilty was an impermissible
burden on Alford's constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction,4 and,
in November, 1970, held that the guilty plea to second degree murder
was valid. The Court explained that where the plea was made from
alternatives available to the defendant and where a strong factual basis
for the plea existed, the guilty plea was voluntarily and intelligently
made. The Court further stated that the plea was not invalid even
though the defendant also asserted his innocence.5
This decision in A lford clarifies the Court's position on the constitu-
tionality of the practice of plea bargaining. By reversing the finding
that Alford's plea to the reduced charge was not voluntarily and in-
telligently made, the Court held that plea bargaining is an acceptable
practice in the administration of criminal justice. Thus the Court ac-
cepted the fact that the plea bargaining system is based on inducements
to the defendant to plead guilty, but these inducements, even in capital
cases, are not unconstitutional per se.
The Court also summarized the procedures which courts have em-
ployed in determining the voluntariness and validity of a guilty plea.
The decision in Alford decided that the only standard to be used in
determining the validity of a guilty plea is "whether the plea repre-
sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses
of action open to the defendant."' 6 The rationale in Alford is a culmi-
nation of the Court's current interpretation of the guilty plea process.'
However, questions are thus raised concerning this standard of volun-
tariness and the real effect of these "safeguards" on a criminal defend-
ant.
2. Alford v. State, 405 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1968).
3. 390 U.S. 570 (1968). The Court held that the capital punishment amend-
ment of the Lindberg Kidnapping Act was unconstitutional. The statute had provided
for capital punishment to be imposed only by a jury after a trial. The risk of death
was encountered only by pleading not guilty and therefore was an impermissible
burden upon the exercise of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.
4. 394 U.S. 956 (1969).
5. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
6. 400 U.S. at 31.
7. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970) and Parker v. North Carolina,
397 U.S. 790 (1970), the Court held that a defendant is influenced by many factors
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Although the guilty plea process has been criticized and is undergoing
change, it is an administrative fact of life for the criminal justice sys-
tem." The practice of plea bargaining is largely responsible for the high
incidence of these guilty pleas, and thus, the efficient functioning of
criminal justice also depends on plea bargaining.' The majority of con-
victions have been and will continue to be by pleas of guilty.
The pervasiveness of the bargaining process in the state and federal
systems indicates that a great deal of time is spent by prosecutors at-
tempting to induce defendants to plead guilty and forego a formal
trial.'0 Any decision by a defendant to plead guilty naturally results
in a waiver of his right to defend and of his right to trial by jury. In
United States v. Jackson," the Supreme Court held that. a statutory
scheme, similar to the one in North Carolina, which encouraged waivers
of trials by jury was unconstitutional, and therefore, a guilty plea en-
tered to escape such a statutory penalty was invalid. Even though
Jackson did not mention plea bargaining, the indirect result of the deci-
sion was to cast doubt on all guilty pleas. 12
In Alford the Court removed all doubt of the validity of plea bar-
gaining per se by refusing to extend the rationale of Jackson to a plea
bargaining situation. The Court flatly stated: "Jackson established no
new test for determining the validity of guilty pleas."' 3  The Court re-
jected the application of Jackson on the ground that the plea of guilty
to second degree murder was not the direct result of the unconstitu-
tional statutory scheme. By the Court's reasoning the unconstitution-
ality of the statute had no bearing on Alford's choice to accept the bar-
gain. Alford's choice would have been the same regardless of the
sentencing differential. 4 Thus even though a defendant proves he
pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty, this alone is not enough to
invalidate his guilty plea. To be entitled to relief under Jackson a de-
fendant must show that his guilty plea was motivated by a statutory
when deciding to plead guilty, and the pressures he faces when he pleads are not
violative of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments per se.
8. D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
WITHOUT TRIAL (1966) (hereinafter cited as NEWMAN).
9. Id. at 76.
10. The most common forms of plea bargaining are a promise of a sentence re-
duction in exchange for a plea of guilty, or a reduction of the charge in exchange for a
plea of guilty.
11. 390 U.S. 570. See note 3, supra.
12. U.S. ex rel Mullin v. Henderson, 312 F. Supp. 1363, 1367 (E.D. La. 1970).
13. 400 U.S. at 31.
14. Judge Haynsworth's Dissent in Alford v. State, 405 F.2d 340, stated that the
defendant's choice was to accept a plea arrangement, and the constitutional infirmity in
the statute was not causally related to his acceptance of the bargain. See also U.S. ex
rel Brown v. La Vallee, 424 F.2d 457 (2nd Cir. 1970) in which the court arrives at
the same conclusion as the Court in Alford with facts very similar to the facts in Alford.
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scheme which authorized a lesser penalty if he pleaded guilty to the
crime charged.
A more important aspect of the Alford decision concerns the treatment
of waiver of rights. In Jackson the Court was primarily concerned
with a statute that would encourage waivers of rights to contest guilt
in the absence of any compelling state interest. However, the result in
Alford, indicates that even though plea bargaining inherently en-
courages waivers, these inducements are tolerable. Inducements nec-
essary to maintain a plea bargaining system burden a defendant's right
to defend and contest his guilt. The Court may have justified the exis-
tence of these burdens on a defendant's rights by applying the rationale
set forth in Sherbert v. Verner.1" In Sherbert the Supreme Court sug-
gested that some constitutional rights are not inviolate. The Court
phrased the relevant test as "whether some compelling state interest...
justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's . . . right." The re-
sult in Alford thus indicates that the right to trial and defend must toler-
ate the chilling effect which is inherent in plea bargaining because of
some compelling state interest.
The decision in Alford was foreshadowed by Brady v. United States16
and Parker v. North Carolina.7 In both cases the Supreme Court af-
firmed the validity of the guilty pleas which were entered to avoid the
possibility of the death penalty. The Court in Brady conceded that the
State's encouragement of guilty pleas is not rendered invalid merely
"because both the State and the defendant often find it advantageous to
preclude the possibility of the maximum penalty authorized by law.""
This is the basis of a plea bargain, and the Brady Court accepted the
practice not only because there is no present alternative, but also be-
cause the Court saw benefits to the defendant and to the State. The
Fifth Amendment does not forbid prosecutors and judges from ac-
cepting guilty pleas to selected counts, to lesser included offenses, or to
reduced charges.19
In light of the Court's approval of plea bargaining practices in the pre-
viously mentioned cases, the question arises: What is the valuable
service plea bargaining performs which permits the "tolerable" effect
of encouraging waivers of constitutional rights? To be able to accept
these burdens on a defendant's constitutional rights the Court must see
15. 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Cf. Scott v. U.S., 419 F.2d 264, 270 (D.C. Cir.
1969) which has facts similar to the facts in Aliord.
16. 397 U.S. 742.
17. 397 U.S. 790.
18. 397 U.S. at 752.
19. Id. at 753.
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plea bargaining as more than efficient;2" the Court must envision it as
desirable in the administration of justice. The arguments for plea bar-
gaining emphasize the potential benefits to both defendants and states.
Defendants who are likely to be convicted can limit their probable pen-
alties, and the burdens of a trial are eliminated. The State realizes the
tremendous gain of avoiding trial. Scarce judicial and prosecutorial
time and energy are conserved for those cases in which the State will not
bargain or the defendant will not waive his right to trial.
In this ideally-operated plea bargaining system, society is benefitted.
One of the objectives of criminal justice administration is to individualize
justice.2' Plea bargaining offers an opportunity to achieve this objective
by permitting leniency to defendants who may not deserve the legis-
latively prescribed sentence. In this way the criminal justice system will
retain flexibility and discretion which is necessary for the system to ap-
pear humane.
The plea bargaining system maintains the guilty plea process. With
no inducements to plead guilty, defendants would not be as willing to
waive their rights, and our trial courts would be flooded with cases.
This problem of overcrowded dockets is a legitimate consideration,
for such a problem would severely curtail, if not eliminate, trial pro-
cedures as we know them today. Thus to keep the criminal justice sys-
tem functioning at all, plea bargaining practices are vitally needed.
Finally, it is argued that plea bargaining offers humane treatment to
any individual charged with a crime who faces the risk of grave punish-
ment. The Fifth Amendment does not require that leniency for many
must be denied to assure that no man is needlessly encouraged to waive
his right to defend.22 To require every defendant to risk the death pen-
alty would be cruel.2 3 To extend the Fifth Amendment to such a situa-
tion would force all defendants to undergo a trial at the risk of their lives.
Thus the Fifth Amendment "protection" would work to the detriment
of defendants as a group. In contrast, the overall impact of the plea
bargain is to benefit defendants as a group. This is the atmosphere of
fundamental fairness in which the criminal justice system should oper-
ate.
Perhaps because of these objectives and potential advantages, the
Court in Alford did not decide that plea bargaining is a constitutionally
20. In the area of confessions (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479-81 (1966))
and habeas corpus (Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963)), the Court has sacrificed
efficiency when constitutional rights were being abridged.
21. NEWMAN at 77.
22. See State v. Forcella, 52 N.J. 263, 245 A.2d 181 (1968).
23. U.S. v. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584.
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unacceptable practice. A plea entered by a defendant to a reduced
charge, or because of a bargain, is not invalid merely because the de-
fendant wished to avoid the greater penalty, even if the penalty is death.
The Court's major concern in Alford is that the guilty plea, whether
the product of a bargain or not, conforms to the standard of voluntari-
ness. 
24
In Alford, the Court reiterated that the standard of voluntariness was
and still is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent
choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant."25
Courts have accepted this general standard which together with Rule
1 1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure26 provides guidelines to
determine the voluntariness of the guilty plea.2" Rule 11 states:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or with the consent of the
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature
of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant
refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty
or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall not
enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that
there is a factual basis for the plea.
The Court in Alford applied the basic requirements of a valid guilty
plea and demonstrated how the standard of voluntariness must be in-
terpreted by the trial courts. The Court attempted to explain what
"safeguards" must be invoked to assure the validity of the plea. A de-
fendant who enters a guilty plea waives constitutional rights, and for
this waiver to be valid, it must be an "intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right."' 28 Thus any guilty plea must be volun-
tary, knowingly made and accurate.
The Court stated the plea is voluntary if it is the "product of a free
and rational choice."29  The possibility of the death penalty and the
opportunity to bargain to reduce the penalty does not render the plea
involuntary. The broad definition of voluntariness as set out in the dis-
sent of Shelton v. United States has become the accepted standard:
24. Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962).
25. 400 U.S. at 31.
26. 18 U.S.C. Rule 11 (1966).
27. McCarthy v. U.S., 394 U.S. 459 (1969) binds federal courts to requirements
of Federal Rule 11 and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) compels state courts
to follow the same basic procedures. Although a factual basis test is not required in
the states, the trend is toward this type of determination. See, n.10 of the Alford
opinion.
28. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
29. 400 U.S. at 31.
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A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct conse-
quences, including the actual value of any commitments made to
him by the court, prosecutor, or his counsel, must stand unless
induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harass-
ment), misrepresentations (including unfilled or unfulfillable pro-
mises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper
as having no proper relationship to prosecutorial business.30
Working within this definition, the Court in Alford could not find a
guilty plea invalid merely because it was the result of a plea bargain.
The standard of voluntariness for a guilty plea is much more limited
than are the standards of voluntariness for the waiver of other constitu-
tional rights. In waiving Fourth Amendment rights, the burden is on
the government to sustain the legal sufficiency of the consent."' Also
in waiving Fifth Amendment rights by confessing, the State under
Miranda v. Arizona3" has the burden of proving the confession is not
coerced. And under Bram v. United States,"3 the confession "must
not be extracted by any sorts of threats or violence, nor obtained by
any direct or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of
any improper influence . . . . " Under this standard the guilty plea
which is induced by a plea bargain to avoid the death penalty would be
an improper influence which would invalidate the plea. However, the
Court in Brady and Alford has impliedly rejected this concept of volun-
tariness and apparently accepted the definition in Shelton. In addition,
defendants who plead guilty are allowed to waive more rights" than are
permissible at any other point in the criminal justice system, and these
waivers are apparently validated by a broader voluntariness standard.
To understand the difference in standards, one must understand the
Court's view of the guilty plea process. The Court in Brady held that
the voluntariness standard for a guilty plea is not inconsistent with
the Bram standard for a confession.3 6  The Court concluded that a de-
fendant in custody, alone and unrepresented by counsel is subjected to
coercion by even a promise of minor benefits because he is too sensi-
30. 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) (Tuttle, J. dissenting), rev'd 246 F.2d 571(5th Cir. 1957). When the decision was reversed Judge Tuttle's dissent became the
majority opinion.
31. Judd v. U.S., 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951). U.S. v. Page, 302 F.2d 81, 83-
84 (9th Cir. 1962).
32. 384 U.S 436 (1966).
33. 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897).
34. Id. at 543.
35. By pleading guilty a defendant not only waives the right to a jury and the
privilege against self-incrimination, but he also forfeits procedural rights which might
lead to dismissal or acquittal at trial, e.g. right to challenge an unlawful search or an
illegal confession, right to attack an insufficient indictment, or the composition of a
grand jury, right to insist that the government produce documents.
36. 397 U.S. at 754.
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tive to inducements in such a situation. The Court distinguished this
from a guilty plea situation by asserting that the plea bargaining pro-
cedure and the whole guilty plea process do not operate in a coercive
atmosphere. The Court in Brady reasoned that where the defendant
has "competent counsel and full opportunity to assess the advantages
and disadvantages of a trial. . ,"'7 there is no danger of an impulsive
response to a plea inducement as there is in a confession situation.
The Court in Alford reiterated this confidence by holding that a bar-
gained-for plea may not be involuntary where the defendant is repre-
sented by competent counsel whose advice was that the plea would be
advantageous.38 Thus the only way the Court can reconcile the dis-
parity in standards is by relying on the guilty plea process operating
with fundamental fairness and propriety.
In addition to being voluntary, a valid guilty plea must be intelli-
gently entered.3" Alford held that an "intelligent plea" is one which is
entered by a defendant who understands the nature of the charge and
the consequences of his plea, and then makes a reasonable choice based
on a rational assessment of his situation. The Court found that Alford
exercised a reasonable choice in light of his counsel's advice, and in
light of the State's evidence.4" It is apparent that the Court's determina-
tion of this requirement is based on the presence or absence of counsel
to advise a defendant.4 If a defendant is advised by counsel, the
Court assumes that he has reached a reasoned assessment of all the fac-
tors for and against pleading guilty, and his decision is rational. In
United States ex rel. Brown v. LaVallee,42 the defendant, indicted
for murder, pleaded guilty after the charge was reduced to second de-
gree murder. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity
of his plea on the basis of "well considered advice of his lawyers" and
"the realities of the defendant's situation. ' 43 The LaVallee court merely
supported this presumption of an intelligent plea based on the pres-
ence of counsel. The Alford Court also defended the validity of the
plea on the basis that Alford was advised by "competent" counsel. Even
though this rationale has been accepted by most state and federal
courts, 44 in practice, the requirement of competency of counsel is as-
37. Id.
38. 400 U.S. at 31.
39. Machibroda v. U.S., 368 U.S. at 483 and 18 U.S.C. Rule 11, Fed. Rules Cr. Proc.
40. State testimony before the court revealed that there were no eyewitnesses, but
there was testimony that Alford stated his intention to kill, and returned home de-
claring he had carried out the killing.
41. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. at 756.
42. 424 F.2d at 460.
43. Id. at 461.
44. U.S. v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) where the court held
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sumed.45
Thus as to the elements of voluntariness and intelligence, the Court
merely summarized the requirements of previous case law. Previously,
the Court has held that the trial judge must make sure the defendant is
aware of the consequences of his plea. As mentioned above, under the
Shelton standard, a plea bargain is not an improper inducement which
deprives the plea of its voluntariness. According to case law, the plea
is assumed to be intelligently entered if the defendant is advised by
"competent counsel. '4 6  However, the Court in Alford was also con-
cerned with procedures to determine the accuracy of the plea. A prop-
erly functioning guilty plea process will induce only guilty defendants to
admit their guilt. Thus a flexible test was sought by the Court to recog-
nize situations in which bargains had induced innocent defendants to
plead guilty.
In this area the Court faced two problems. First, Federal Rule 11
provides that the trial court may inquire into the factual basis of the plea.
This aspect of the Rule had never been clarified by the Supreme Court
and trial courts were uncertain as to how extensive this examination of
the facts should be.47 Alford held that, in a situation where Rule 11 was
not directly applicable, the judge may hear a summary of the State's case
and the testimony of the defendant. If the evidence is substantially
against the defendant and if his plea is voluntary and intelligent, the
court may accept the plea. This provides a broad base for accepting
pleas, since most defendants are not charged with crimes until the State
has seemingly substantial cases against them. In addition, the evidence
which the court hears at this stage may be inadmissible at trial.48
The second problem facing the Court was related to this factual basis
that the defendant makes a deliberate and measured choice when he and his attorney
appraise the evidence. State v. Stacy, 43 Wash. 358, 361, 261 P.2d 400, 402 (1953)
where the court concluded: "Where counsel is experienced and able to weigh the desir-
bility of pleading guilty to a lesser offense . . . there would seem to be little doubt that
a knowing, intelligent choice is exercised."
45. Morris v. U.S., 315 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 (N.D. Ga. 1970) held that mistaken
evaluation by counsel is not ineffective assistance unless the attorney was so "inept
and incompetent as to render the proceedings a farce." Also, the Supreme Court in
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 772 (1970) held that a defendant was not in-
competently advised by his attorney and entitled to relief unless the defendant dem-
onstrated "gross error on the part of counsel."
46. See notes 42, 43, 44, 45 supra.
47. McCoy v. U.S., 363 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1966) held that the court could
properly accept the guilty plea if "significant evidence" was present. Also, in Bruce
v. U.S., 379 F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1967) the court concluded that the trial judge
can accept a guilty plea if he determines that the "evidence establishes a high prob-
ability of conviction."
48. From the Court's opinion in Alford, it is apparent that a portion of the
State's evidence against Alford was hearsay evidence. In McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, the Court upheld the guilty plea which was made by the defendant because of
a coerced confession which would have been inadmissible at trial.
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requirement. The Court was faced with a situation where Alford
affirmed his decision to plead guilty, but refused to admit his guilt, and, in
fact, affirmatively stated that he was innocent. The Court's decision
whether to accept the plea or not was based primarily on its interpretation
of the guilty plea process. Alford clearly stated that an admission of
guilt is not a necessary element of a voluntary and intelligent plea. In
Hudson v. United States,49 a plea of nolo contendere5" was held to be
an admission of guilt for purposes of conviction. Thus, if a nolo con-
tendere plea was acceptable as a guilty plea, a voluntary guilty plea
may be acceptable even though the defendant refuses to admit his
guilt publicly. Alford has gone further with its interpretation of the
guilty plea process by holding that such a plea is acceptable without an
admission of guilt, even if the plea is coupled with protestations of in-
nocence.
Some courts have refused to accept pleas of guilty if they are incon-
sistent with defendants' statements concerning their guilt.5 ' However,
the A lford Court did not accept this interpretation and ruled that an
admission of guilt is not essential in a valid guilty plea. The Court saw
the guilty plea process as Justice Goldberg defined it in his dissenting
opinion in Dorrough v. United States: "In the guilty plea process the de-
fendant finds what facts he can, and then with the facts and the law, he
makes a decision as to a plea."52  The court in McCoy v. United States
stated that requiring the defendant to admit his guilt, or the trial judge
to eliminate the existence of any doubt as to innocence, would be to
usurp the fact-finding function of a trial. 53 The court went on to say
that there may be many reasons why a defendant may be unwilling or
unable to admit his guilt, but if he knowingly, voluntarily, and under-
standingly consents to plead guilty, his plea will be accepted. The Al-
ford Court has assumed that the defendant can find the facts and can
give a knowing consent to a guilty plea regardless of expressions of in-
nocence.
The Court has tried to balance two theories concerning the guilty
plea process. First, under the factual basis requirement, the Court
proceeded under the assumption that guilty pleas should be entered
49. 272 U.S. 451, 455 (1926).
50. The plea of nolo contendere is considered to be a consent by the defendant to
be punished, even though he does not admit his guilt. The Court in Alford implied
that there is no constitutional difference between a plea of guilty in which the de-
fendant refused to admit his guilt and a plea of nolo contendere.
51. Griffin v. U.S., 405 F.2d 1378, 1380 (D.C. Cir. 1968), State v. Leyba, 80 N.M.
190, 453 P.2d 211 (1969); People v. Hetherington, 379 I11. 71, 39 N.E.2d 361 (1942).
52. 385 F.2d 887, 895 (5th Cir. 1967), ajfd on reh. 397 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1968).
53. 363 F.2d at 308.
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only by guilty defendants. This is in accord with the proper objectives
of the system. Secondly, the Court accepted the theory that the plea
should be decided upon by the defendant if he pleads knowingly, intelli-
gently and voluntarily. Persons asserting their innocence are allowed
to plead guilty. This theory is based on the realities of the criminal
justice system. The Court in Alford tried to compromise these theories
by arriving at a conclusion whereby the defendant can plead guilty while
still asserting his innocence, if there is a factual basis for the plea. The
result of this approach may allow innocent defendants to plead guilty
on the basis of a judicial determination. This determination closely ap-
proximates the jury's duty, but is carried on without the safeguards of a
formal trial. The assessment of facts at the final stage is taken away
from the defendant and is given to the court.
The Court in Alford tried to develop a flexible factual basis test for
this factual determination. What the Court did, however, was to give
trial courts another method of determining that a defendant understands
the true situation-if there is a factual basis, the plea is obviously a
rational choice. Such a determination does not, in fact, guarantee the ac-
curacy of the plea, because a defendant whose only concern is his
sentence may not willingly contest the State's evidence. The Court, be-
fore Alford, stated in Brady:
We would have serious doubts about this case if encouragement of
guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likeli-
hood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely
condemn themselves. But our view is to the contrary and is based
on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves that pleas
of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent de-
fendants with adequate advice of counsel and there is nothing
to question the accuracy and reliability of defendants' admissions
that they committed crimes with which they are charged. 54
The Court appears to have departed from this standard in Alford by al-
lowing a defendant to plead guilty while protesting his innocence. The
Court may have increased the likelihood of defendants falsely condemn-
ing themselves. The only safeguard is the factual determination. The
alternative, however, would be to require a defendant, who although he
maintains his innocence, recognizes that a close to unbeatable circumstan-
tial case opposes him, to lose an opportunity to plead guilty to a lesser
charge. Here also the factual determination serves to insure that the
accused has not overestimated the persuasiveness of the State's case
against him.
54. 397 U.S. at 758.
356
Vol. 2: 346
Case Comments
The Court held that a system of criminal justice which allows a de-
fendant to eliminate the risk of severe penalty, and allows the State
to conserve its scarce resources is constitutional. The Court, by out-
lining procedures to safeguard the defendant's rights, attempts to in-
sure that this will eliminate the problems of the guilty plea process.
It is questionable if they have fully succeeded in accomplishing this
purpose. These procedures might perform their function as safeguards,
if, in fact, the criminal justice system is an adversary system. However,
the plea bargaining process is not a "give-and-take negotiation . . .
between the prosecution and defense which possess relatively equal
bargaining power." 5  The defendant who is a party to a bargain is not
in a position to determine its fairness and cannot make a comprehensive
assessment of all the circumstances. The guilty plea system as set out
in Aflord is desirable only when the process is reliable and procedurally
fair.
The guilty plea process is an administrative operation. An initial
guilt determination is made by police and prosecutors at their discre-
tion and because of administrative pressures. Defendants are then "bar-
gained" into pleading guilty. A defendant charged with a crime is
concerned only with the direct consequences. The pressure from his at-
torney and the prosecutor during the bargaining process may be inher-
ently coercive. Many defendants cannot evaluate a bargain adequately
since they are uninformed and powerless. The State structures two alter-
natives,56 and encourages defendants to plead guilty to the lesser of two
evils. Many "competent" defense attorneys do not equalize the bar-
gaining positions since they automatically tell their clients to accept a
bargain. 57 An attorney can advise his client, but cannot eliminate the
coercion inherent in the choice, regardless of his competence.
A defendant pleading guilty waives his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights. Johnson v. Zerbst held that a waiver must be an "intentional re-
linquishment of a known right" to be effective. 58  In Garrity v. New
Jersey, 9 the Court held that an individual's choice to waive his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights rather than be dismissed from his job
was involuntary since it was coerced. In the usual plea bargaining
situation, the defendant certainly faces more severe pressure than was
55. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56. The State "offers" the defendant his choice of going to trial and risking a
greater penalty, or pleading guilty.
57. Tigar, Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in The Citadel, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 22 (1970).
58. Supra note 28.
59. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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exercised in Garrity. The guilty plea is accepted as voluntary in these
situations, even when the defendant is facing capital punishment.6"
In addition, the defendant waives procedural errors. In McMann v.
Richardson,6 the defendant in a habeas corpus proceeding alleged he
had pleaded guilty because of the existence of what he now deemed to
be a coerced confession. The Court refused to invalidate the guilty plea
in the absence of any evidence that he was incompetently advised by
counsel concerning the admissibility of the confession. Thus possibly
coerced confessions or arguably unlawful searches may add to the pres-
sures on a defendant to plead guilty. In such situations, the intentional,
free choice standard of Zerbst is replaced by the requirements of Alford.
The basis of the safeguards which the Alford Court offered to de-
fendants is afforded through the accepted role of the trial judge and
the role of the defense counsel. The Alford Court attempted to ap-
proximate the protections of a trial by allowing the trial judge to scruti-
nize the plea bargaining procedures. However, the guilty plea process
itself makes it impossible for the trial judge to completely perform this
function. One of the major concerns of the trial judge is assuring a
factual basis for the plea. This provides very limited protection against
inaccurate pleas. By the time the defendant enters his guilty plea,
he has become convinced that the bargain is the best route for him.
Thus he is not compelled to contest the State's evidence.62 Because
the prosecutor can almost always present a prima facie case, a courtroom
hearing by the judge will not usually result in a finding different from
the defense counsel's acceptance of the bargain.
In effect, the only way left for the judge to safeguard the defendant's
rights is to consider the pressures and procedural errors which may
have caused the plea, in light of the defendant's assertion of his innocence.
If the Alford Court insists that the trial judge take a more active role,
the focal point of concern should be with why the defendant pleaded
guilty. The Court stated that its motive is to equalize the conditions
under which the bargaining takes place. The role given to the trial
judge who is presumed to be the symbol of justice to the defendant may
accentuate the inequality of the process. The trial judge cannot realis-
tically ascertain the motives of the prosecutor who has offered the
bargain, nor can he determine the assistance given by defense counsel. 63
The only effect, then, of the judge's increased activity under Alford will
60. Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
61. Supra note 45.
62. The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1393 (1970).
63. Scott v. U.S., 419 F.2d 264 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Wright, J. concurring).
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be to protect the defendant from flagrant abuses. Innocent defend-
ants may still plead guilty, and some defendants will still waive their
rights. Thus the steps the Court has taken in Alford have not com-
pletely corrected the basic problems of the plea bargain.
In his dissent in Dorrough v. United States, Justice Goldberg attacked
the majority's reliance on a factual basis requirement. 64 The propriety
of the plea bargaining process must depend, not on the trial judge, but
on the behavior of the participants-the prosecutor and the defense
attorney. '  The prosecutor works in a complex bureaucracy. His ma-
jor preoccupation is to dispose of a high proportion of criminal offenders.
He is motivated by the need for speed and finality, and he determines
guilt by a series of informal decisions.66 This determination is only part
of the discretionary decision-making process which comprise the
criminal justice system. However, if the prosecutor overcharges to in-
crease his bargaining position, or if he offers to bargain because of a lack
of time and resources, he has improperly exercised this discretion.
67
The Court has tried to impose an obligation on the trial judge to su-
pervise the fairness of the bargain and to prevent these occurrences.
Even under the Alford interpretation these improprieties remain invisible
to the judge. The only party in a position to recognize the unfairness
of the bargain and to really aid the defendant is the defense counsel,
who is a participant in the bargain himself.
Defense counsel is relied upon by the court to be the equalizer in
the bargaining process. He is seen as relieving the defendant of the
pressures of plea bargaining and negotiating on his behalf.68 However,
defense attorneys may also be concerned with the same objectives as
the prosecutors-saving time, labor, expense and avoiding trial. The
theory has been expressed that criminal attorneys are part of the crimi-
nal justice bureaucracy, and they plead their clients guilty because this
is the quickest way to dispose of the case and collect a fee.6" The at-
torney's major concern may not always be the client, but to maintain his
appearance as advocate in an adversary setting. The defense attorney
must realize that he plays the most important role in the plea bargaining
process. Most defendants plead guilty because their attorneys tell them
to plead. The attorney crystallizes their alternatives for them, and conse-
64. Supra note 52.
65. Gentile, Fair Bargains and Accurate Pleas, 49 B.U. LAW REV. 514, 524 (1969).
66. 83 HARV. L. REV. at 1388.
67. Scott v. U.S., 419 F.2d at 276-277.
68. Supra notes 38 and 39.
69. Blumberg, "Lawyers With Convictions", in The Scales of Justice 51-67 (A.
Blumberg ed. 1970) (hereinafter cited as Blumberg).
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quently, is the critical element in most decisions to plead guilty.70 There-
fore, the concept of his duties is most important in providing safeguards
for the defendant.
If all "law is compromise", the compromise in the conviction pro-
cess is neither surprising nor less desirable than compromise exer-
cised at other stages in the criminal justice process. 71
Plea bargaining is a reality. The issue which the Court was con-
cerned with in Alford was how to provide safeguards for defendants in
such situations. The defense attorney, as the defendant's agent in this
compromise can assure the defendant that his rights will, in fact, be safe-
guarded. Too many attorneys are not skilled in the job of carefully
assessing the strength of the prosecutor's case before advising their cli-
ents to plead guilty.7 2 They do not have skill in analyzing confessions,
searches, and seizures which may be critical aspects in the process of
assessment.
If the attorney becomes skilled in these ways and recognizes and ac-
cepts his role as an agent of the defendant in this process of compromise,
the plea bargaining procedure, and the whole guilty plea process, will be
a substantially more equitable proceeding. To be able to effectively aid
his client, the attorney must realize that he is the link between the system
and the accused who are both striving to terminate the process with a
"minimum of damage."7 3  The Court in Alford and in Brady saw the
guilty plea process operating as beneficial to each side. If the attorney
realizes his job as a compromiser, and performs skillfully, the benefits
to both sides can be real, and not merely apparent. This is the key to
attaining the propriety of the plea bargaining process.
The Alford Court expressed confidence in the functioning of the guilty
plea process through plea bargaining, even though the necessity of the
system compels such an ex post facto acceptance. The Court also set
out procedures to assure a voluntary and intelligent plea. However,
what the Court did was merely to summarize the existing procedure.
The guilty plea process needs reform, and the Court in Alford has
placed supervision in the hands of the trial judges. This increased re-
liance on the trial courts is a beginning. But the defendant will not be
completely protected from the pressures inherent in plea bargaining.
To obtain benefits for the defendant, the system of criminal justice ad-
70. Id. at 63.
71. NEWMAN at 76.
72. Tigar, 84 HARv. L. REv. at 22. Also cf. Comment, Incompetency of Retained
Counsel 1 LOYOLA U.L.J. 166 (1970).
73. Blumberg at 59.
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ministration must depend on the skill, integrity, and professionalism of
the attorney. "There is no one else in the court structure more ideally
suited to handle this than the defense attorney. 7 4
ROSEANN OLIVER
74. Id.
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